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ABSTRACT 
 
The Persistence of Inferences in Memory 
for Younger and Older Adults. (May 2009) 
Jimmeka Guillory, B.S., Texas A&M University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Lisa Geraci 
 
Younger and older adults’ susceptibility to the continued influence of inferences 
in memory was examined using a paradigm implemented by Wilkes and Leatherbarrow. 
Research has shown that younger adults have difficulty forgetting inferences they make 
after reading a passage, even if the information that the inferences are based on is later 
shown to be untrue. The current study examined the effects of these inferences on 
memory in the lab and tested whether older adults, like younger adults, are influenced by 
the lingering effects of these false inferences. In addition, this study examined the nature 
of these inferences, by examining younger and older adults’ subjective experiences and 
confidence associated with factual recall and incorrect inference recall. Results showed 
that younger and older adults are equally susceptible to the continued influence of 
inferences. Both younger and older adults gave primarily remember judgments to factual 
questions but primarily believe judgments to inference questions. This is an important 
finding because it demonstrates that people may go against what they remember or know 
occurred because of a lingering belief that the information might still be true. Also, the 
finding that participants do actually give more believe responses to inference questions is 
important because it demonstrates that there is a third state of awareness that people will 
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readily use when making inferences. Participants were also more confident when making 
remember and know judgments compared to believe judgments. This is an interesting 
finding because it supports the theory that both remember and know judgments can be 
associated with high confidence. 
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1. INTRODUCTION: THE EFFECTS OF INFERENCES ON MEMORY 
 
 In the real world, inferences can have a very powerful effect on people. Consider 
the following example provided by, Seifert (2002): On the nightly news there is a story 
about a family of four found dead in their home. The newscaster mentions that the family 
had dined at a local Chinese restaurant the night before. A few days later the same 
newscaster provides an update on the story and announces that the medical examiner on 
the case concluded that the family died from carbon monoxide poisoning. However, 
months later the Chinese restaurant goes out of business. In this example the Chinese 
restaurant likely went out of business because people inferred that the family in the news 
died from food poisoning at the restaurant, even though there was a retraction indicating 
that the family died from carbon monoxide. This everyday example demonstrates the 
powerful effect that inferences have on people; so powerful in fact that it influences 
peoples’ behavior, even in the face of counter information. 
 The current study examined the effects of inferences on memory in the lab, and 
tested whether older adults, like younger adults, are influenced by the lingering effects of 
these false inferences. In addition, this study examined the nature of these inferences, by 
examining younger and older adult’s subjective experiences associated with factual recall 
and incorrect inference recall.  
Research has shown that younger adults have a difficult time forgetting inferences 
they make after reading a passage, even if the information that the inferences are based 
on is later shown to be untrue (see Seifert, 2002 for a review). This is an interesting 
____________ 
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finding because it shows that even though participants explicitly acknowledge that the 
information has been corrected, they continue to be influenced by it when answering 
inference questions. In the lab the lasting effect of incorrect information has been studied 
using a series of on-the-scene news reports (Wilkes & Leatherbarrow, 1988). In this 
paradigm, participants heard about a fire in progress, in one instance, and were told that, 
“cans of oil paint and gas cylinders” had been stored in a room where the fire started. 
Later messages referred to “oily smoke and sheets of flame”, “explosions”, and “toxic 
fumes” as features of the fire. Later still, participants read a message stating a correction, 
which indicated that no paint or gas cylinders had been in the storage room. Results 
showed that participants recalled the correction statement indicating that the storage room 
did not have any gas or paint, but was instead empty. However, when asked for a possible 
cause of the toxic fumes, participants responded using the inference based on the original 
information provided by the report, that paint and gas cylinders were a possible cause of 
the fire. This effect is important because it shows that even though people can explicitly 
recall that information was corrected they continue to use this incorrect initial 
information when making inferences. 
  There have been many theories about why inferences have a continued effect on 
memory after the information has been corrected. According to one theory, inferences 
persist in memory because people fail to edit their memories (Wilkes & Leatherbarrow, 
1988). In particular, this theory suggests that people make elaborative inferences during 
reading before the correction occurs. Due to a failure in editing, these inferences appear 
to outlast the discrediting of the initial information. However, some findings are 
inconsistent with this theory. For example, results show that participants continue to 
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make incorrect inferences even when the correction is provided immediately after the 
misinformation, presumably before the participants make the original inference during 
reading (Johnson & Seifert, 1994). This finding suggests that inferences persist even if 
the participants have the opportunity to edit their inferences early in the experiment. 
Alternatively, participants may make inferences automatically upon reading the 
information, and so an immediate correction may not have an effect on participants’ 
inferences.  
The accessibility theory states that the mere presence of information in memory 
may lead people to incorporate it into later reasoning. If information is available in 
memory, regardless of its status, it may affect the conclusions that people draw (Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1973). As a test of this theory, after reading the correction, participants 
were asked to generate their own possible causes of the fire (Johnson & Seifert, 1999). 
The authors proposed that if the mere availability of information in memory results in its 
use, people should be able to rely on the alternate causes they generated. However, the 
results showed that generating alternatives did not decrease the likelihood of mentioning 
the original corrected information as an answer to the inference questions, suggesting that 
the availability of the alternate causes in memory was not enough for it to be incorporated 
into later reasoning when answering the inference questions.  
 Alternatively, researchers have suggested that inferences persist because 
participants are not provided with alternate explanations of the cause of the fire (Johnson 
& Seifert; 1994, 1999). In the absence of alternative explanations, participants may 
choose to ignore the reported inaccuracy and consider the causal story as “too good not to 
be true”. The idea is that presenting a good explanation and subsequently ruling it out, 
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leaves a gap in understanding, which may cause people to have difficulty understanding 
the story unless an alternative explanation is presented to them (Seifert, 2002). In a test of 
this theory, participants were given plausible and causal alternatives to the 
misinformation. The results showed that providing these alternatives allowed participants 
to escape the continued inference effect. Thus, the results were interpreted to mean that 
inferences persist in memory because there are typically no alternate explanations for the 
original events that one has learned. Providing alternatives may be one way to help 
participants overcome the persistence of inferences however; it does not explain the 
initial causes of the persistence of inferences.  
 It is important to understand how the persistence of inferences affects people in 
order to determine what may cause this phenomenon. Numerous studies have 
demonstrated the robustness of the continued influence of misinformation when making 
inferences. This effect also has important practical relevance; for example, in the 
courtroom. Imagine that a juror is told something, and later they are told to “scratch that 
from memory”. They may be able to recall that the information was corrected but they 
may not be able to forget the inferences that they made about the information. Indeed, 
mock jury research has shown that verdicts can be influenced by a wide range of 
nonevidentiary factors presented both inside and outside the courtroom (Kassin & 
Studebaker, 1998); including testimony ruled inadmissible by the judge (Pickel, 1995; 
Sue, Smith, & Caldwell, 1973; Thompson, Fong, & Rosenhan, 1981; Wissler & Saks, 
1985). This finding demonstrates that jurors can be influenced by information that they 
were told to disregard, which may be due to lingering inferences that they made about the 
initial information.  
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 The continued inference effect is also important when considering what goes on 
in a classroom. Imagine that an instructor is giving a lecture and later goes back to correct 
something that was previously said. Research has shown that children, in comparison to 
adults, are less able to inhibit to-be-forgotten information (e.g., Harnishfeger & Pope, 
1996; Lehman, Morath, Franklin, & Elbaz, 1998). So, even though the students are told 
to forget what they heard, they may have a hard time forgetting the information, 
especially the inferences they made about the original information.  
The influence of inferences also has social relevance. For example, imagine that 
you are told that your new roommate was kicked out of their last apartment. Later you are 
told that this is not true. Even after the correction you may continue to have suspicions 
about whether they will be a good roommate (e.g., Tanford & Penrod, 1984; Yamauchi, 
2005). In addition, research has demonstrated that it may be even more difficult to forget 
this information, or the inferences made from it, because it is negative or unpleasant 
(Isbell, Smith, & Wyer, 1998). So, the continued influence of misinformation when 
making inferences can influence small things such as decisions about where to eat to 
more important things like judgments and perceptions about people.  
However, despite its robustness and importance, the continued inference effect is 
not well understood. Also, it is surprising that older adults have not been examined using 
this paradigm, because older adults are often jurors in court cases, and are consumers of 
news information.  
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2. OLDER ADULTS’ SUSCEPTIBILITY TO THE EFFECTS OF FALSE 
INFERENCES  
 
 There are reasons to predict that older adults would be more susceptible to the 
continued influence of inferences. There are also reasons to predict that they would be 
less susceptible. One reason why older adults may be more susceptible to the continued 
influence of inferences is because research in the false memory literature shows that older 
adults are often misled by false information, and are more susceptible to misinformation 
in an eyewitness testimony paradigm (e.g., Cohen & Faulkner, 1989; Roediger & Geraci, 
2007; LaVoie, Mertz, & Richmond, 2007). One theory is that older adults are more 
susceptible to misinformation because of an accessibility bias (Jacoby, 1999). According 
to this theory older adults’ are more susceptible to misinformation because they cannot 
recollect the earlier event, making it necessary for them to rely more on recent 
information available in memory. Older adult’s inability to recollect the earlier event 
could have important implications for the current study because, older adults may rely on 
the inferences made with the misinformation if they cannot recall the correction. So older 
adults may make the same incorrect inferences as younger adults but they may fail to 
explicitly recall the correction. Also, numerous studies have used the Deese-Roediger-
McDermott (DRM) paradigm to show older adults’ greater susceptibility to 
misinformation. In the DRM paradigm participants study a list of words (e.g., bed, rest, 
awake, etc.), each related to a nonpresented critical lure word (e.g., sleep). The results 
show that older adults are more likely than younger adults to false alarm to nonstudied 
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lures (e.g., McCabe & Smith, 2002; Watson, McDermott, & Balota, 2004; Balota, 
Cortese, Duchek, Adams, Roediger, McDermott, et al., 1999).  
Another popular theory is that older adults have more difficulty than younger 
adults identifying the source of information, and this causes them to have more false 
memories (e.g., Dehon & Brédart, 2004; Watson et al., 2004; Roediger & Geraci, 2007). 
This theory suggests that older adults may be more susceptible to the continued influence 
of inferences because they may not be able to recall the source of the correction, which 
would cause them to use the original information when making inferences.  
 Perhaps most relevant for the current proposal, research has shown that in 
comparison to young adults, older adults are more likely to erroneously recognize 
pragmatic inferences (McDermott & Chan, 2006). This was demonstrated by giving 
participants the following example sentence: “The karate champion hit the cinder block”. 
After reading the sentence participants erroneously recalled having read the verb broke. 
When faced with the original sentence and the pragmatic inference on a forced-choice 
recognition test, older adults were more likely than younger adults to choose the 
inference option instead of the correct option. This finding has important implications for 
the proposed study because, even though it uses a different paradigm, it shows older 
adults greater susceptibility to the influence of inferences.  
The second reason why older adults may be more susceptible to the continued 
influence of inferences is because of an inhibition deficit. A great deal of research, 
including the memory and reading comprehension literature shows that older adults may 
have trouble inhibiting irrelevant information (e.g., Hamm & Hasher, 1992; Hasher & 
Zacks, 1988; Zacks, Hasher, Doren, Hamm, & Attig, 1987). According to this theory, 
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when older adults are exposed to the original information it becomes activated, however 
later, when they are exposed to the correction it also becomes activated. The inhibition 
deficit theory argues that older adults have difficulty resolving the response competition 
between these two bits of information and are unable to inhibit the irrelevant information 
to select the relevant information at test.  
In the reading comprehension literature this has been tested using “garden path 
sentences”. In this paradigm participants are given verbs that at one point in time could 
have two possible meanings activated (for example, ‘shot’ referring to taking a picture 
and ‘shot’, referring to shooting a gun). The typical finding is that older adults keep 
active the irrelevant meaning longer than younger adults (Hamm & Hasher, 1992; Hasher 
& Zacks, 1988; Zacks, Hasher, Doren, Hamm, & Attig, 1987). Results from these reading 
comprehension studies suggest that, just as they have problems forgetting an irrelevant 
interpretation of a word, older adults may have trouble forgetting inferences. 
 Another reason why older adults may be more susceptible to the continued 
influence of inferences is because they may have difficulty intentionally forgetting 
information. One critical distinction between the false memory paradigms (e.g., Gallo & 
Roediger, 2003) and the inference paradigm (e.g., Wilkes & Leatherbarrow, 1988) is that, 
in a false memory paradigm participants aren’t told anything about the misinformation. In 
the inference paradigm participants are implicitly instructed to ignore or forget the 
information, this aspect of the paradigm resembles a directed forgetting task. There have 
only been a handful of studies that examine age effects using the directed forgetting 
paradigm. One study comparing directed forgetting in younger and older adults found 
that, when using the item method, (participants are presented with a list of words and 
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each word is individually cued as “to be forgotten” or “to be remembered”) directed 
forgetting was observed in both groups, however, the effect was smaller for older adults 
on both recall and recognition (Hasher, Zacks, Stoltzfus, & Kane, 1996).This finding has 
been replicated in numerous studies (e.g., Andrés, Van der Linden, & Parmentier, 2004; 
Sego, Golding, and Gottlob, 2006). When the list method is used (“to be forgotten” and 
“to be remembered” items are presented in separate lists and the instruction to forget is 
typically presented after an initial list), the overall finding is that older adults show 
directed forgetting in recall but not recognition (e.g., Sego, Golding, and Gottlob, 2006; 
Basden, Basden, & Gargano, 1993; Geiselman, Bjork, & Fishman, 1983). All of the 
findings have been interpreted as support for the hypothesis that older adults are less able 
than younger adults to inhibit information (e.g., Hamm & Hasher, 1992; Hasher & Zacks, 
1988; Zacks, Hasher, Doren, Hamm, & Attig, 1987).  
An additional reason why older adults may be more susceptible to the continued 
influence of inferences is because research has shown that older adults rely more on gist-
based encoding and retrieval operations, whereas younger adults are able to remember 
specific information (Castel, Farb, & Craik, 2007; Kensinger & Schacter, 1999; Tun, 
Wingfield, Rosen, & Blanchard, 1998; Adams, Labouvie-Vief, Hobart, & Dorosz, 1990; 
Koutstaal, Schacter, Galluccio, & Stofer, 1999; Koutstaal, 2003; Geraci, McDaniel, 
Manzano, & Roediger, in press). This is important because, it suggests that if younger 
adults have more distinctive, recollective material available to them then they may be 
more likely to recall the correction when answering inference questions. Since older 
adults have been shown to rely more on gist, they may be less likely to recall the 
correction when making inferences. This does not mean that older adults do not encode 
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the details of the story, they may just be less likely to use the details when tested 
(Koutstaal, 2003).     
In contrast, there are also reasons to believe that older adults may be less 
susceptible to the continued influence of inferences. For example, older adults may be 
less susceptible to the lasting effects of inferences on memory because they may not be 
able to make initial inferences as well as younger adults (Cohen, 1979; Hasher & Zacks, 
1988; Zacks et al., 1987). There seems to be a debate in the reading comprehension 
literature about older adults’ ability to make inferences after reading a passage. The 
results appear to depend on a number of factors. First, older adults are less accurate than 
younger adults when making inferences that are based on implicit facts but not when the 
facts are explicitly stated (Cohen, 1979). For example, if older adults are told that it is 
autumn they can make inferences about the weather, however if they are told that there 
are leaves on the ground they may have a harder time making inferences about the 
temperature and things of that nature. This finding suggests that older adults may have 
difficulty generating inferences. In contrast, older adults are likely to show evidence of 
inference generation when the sentences are highly related, when the connection is 
explicitly presented, the inference is highly expected, and when reading is self paced 
(Hasher & Zacks, 1988; Zacks, et al., 1987). Therefore, it seems that older adults’ ability 
to make inferences is more dependent on saliency than on necessity. So, older adults may 
be more likely to make an inference if the information is presented in a way that makes it 
easy for them to do so; as opposed to making the inference because it is necessary for 
comprehension. This is an important finding for the current study because it suggests that 
older adults may not be able to accurately answer the inference questions, since the 
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information that the inferences should be based on has been corrected and is not very 
explicit. For example, in the current paradigm used by Wilkes and Leatherbarrow (1988), 
one inference question asks about a possible cause of the explosions during the fire. Even 
though the correction explicitly states that the storage room was empty and there was no 
gas or paint, older adults may not rely on this information when making inferences 
because there may be confusion between the initial information and the correction, 
causing it to be less salient. They may not use any of the provided information at all and 
come up with their own explanation for the cause of the explosions. There has also been 
research done in the reading comprehension literature that examines older adults’ ability 
to make bridging versus predictive or elaborative inferences but the data is mixed. 
Studies have found that older adults can make bridging inferences (those that are 
necessary for comprehension) just as well as younger adults when they are tested 
immediately compared to more delayed testing measures (Cohen, 1979, 1981). In 
contrast, for elaborative inferences (those that relate to general world knowledge rather 
than to current text processing demands) delayed memory measures show age differences 
favoring younger adults in some studies (Light, Valencia-Laver, & Zavis, 1991; Till, 
1985; Till & Walsh, 1980; Burke & Yee, 1984) but not in others (Belmore, 1981; Hess & 
Arnould, 1986; Radvansky, Gerard, Zacks, & Hasher, 1990).  
The second reason why older adults may be less susceptible to the continued 
influence of inferences is because of an encoding deficit (e.g., Spencer & Raz, 1995). 
This hypothesis attributes age-related memory problems to an inability to encode the 
necessary information. So if this were true, the original information that would enable 
older adults to make the inferences would not be encoded in the first place. Similarly, 
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older adults might not encode the original information as well as younger adults because 
of working memory deficits (e.g., Haut, Chen, & Edwards, 1999). The original study on 
the continued influence of inferences found that participants with low working memory 
scored worse on a free recall of the story compared to participants with a higher working 
memory (Wilkes & Leatherbarrow, 1988). However, participants with a low working 
memory were not more likely to use the original information when making inferences 
than those with a high working memory. This may be because they never encoded the 
information to begin with, so they failed to mention the paint and oil cans on the 
inference questions. If older adults have a lower working memory, they may not be able 
to encode the original information as well as younger adults with a higher working 
memory. Thus, they will not be as susceptible to the continued influence of the inference. 
Finally, older adults may not show a memory deficit with the paradigm because 
the critical information is meaningful and important for the story. Research shows that 
age effects in memory are not obtained for more meaningful (Castel, Farb, & Craik, 
2007; Castel, Benjamin, Craik, & Watkins, 2002; Rahhal, May, & Hasher, 2002) or 
emotional (Kensinger, 2008) information. 
In sum, there are reasons to make predictions on both sides. Older adults may be 
more or less susceptible to the continued influence of inferences. The current study is 
designed to examine the extent to which older adults will be affected by the continued 
influence of inferences, even in the face of corrected information.   
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3. EXPLORING THE SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCES OF INCORRECT INFERENCES 
 
 As briefly mentioned earlier, the current study examined the nature of inferences 
by looking at younger and older adults’ subjective experiences. It is difficult to 
understand what someone is doing or thinking when they are making an inference. Are 
they intentionally recalling the study event (information), is it a more automatic process, 
or, is the inference retained because it has simply come to be believed? To better 
understand this process, we examined subjective experiences. In 1985 Endel Tulving 
proposed a method for studying two types of memory, introducing the distinction 
between remember and know responses. Remembering and knowing are two subjective 
states of awareness that are associated with retrieval of the past. Remembering refers to a 
vivid recollection for ones’ personal past, one in which an individual becomes 
consciously aware again of some event or experience, while knowing refers to 
impersonal knowledge of the past; this includes the general sense of familiarity we have 
about more abstract knowledge.   
 We predicted that in the inference paradigm there will likely be more remember 
responses for the factual questions that participants will receive about the stories. 
Younger adults should also be much more likely to give remember judgments than older 
adults (Perfect & Dasgupta, 1997). Then the question is, what response will younger and 
older adults have for inference questions? To assess the subjective experience associated 
with inferences we included a third option, believing. We predicted that believing could 
be dissociated from knowing (or familiarity) because people provide a know judgment 
when they are certain that the item was studied but they cannot consciously recollect 
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anything about its actual occurrence. In contrast, a believe judgment would not require a 
person to be certain or to rely on a memory. The information may just feel plausible, or 
the person simply believes it to be true. It can also be dissociated from a remember 
response because it doesn’t require a person to be certain because they have a recollection 
for an event or time in the past. For example, one might recall the incident with the 
trapped coal miners in West Virginia in January of 2006. Initially the miners’ families 
were told that all but one of the thirteen miners had been found alive, only later to be told 
that twelve of the missing thirteen miners were actually dead. Hearing that they were 
alive and then being told that indeed they were not may have been more difficult for the 
families than if they had known the truth from the beginning. They may believe that they 
are still alive even in the face of the corrected information, questioning why they would 
have been told they were alive if this were not true. Similarly, with the lab paradigm, one 
interpretation is that participants continue to believe the original information because 
they have a suspicion that they wouldn’t have been told the information if it weren’t true. 
So one hypothesis is that participants may give more believe responses to the inference 
questions than the factual questions. We also included a post test questionnaire to 
determine why participants thought they had been given a correction. 
In the current study, participants also provided confidence judgments. Asking 
participants how confident they are about their inferences and factual knowledge about 
the stories aids in understanding the process of making an inference. It also helps us to 
determine how these subjective experiences relate to confidence.  
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4. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHOD  
 
4.1 Method 
 Participants. Forty younger adult participants from Texas A&M University and 
39 older adult participants from the Bryan/College Station community participated in the 
study. Younger adults received course credit and older adults received a $10 honorarium 
for their participation. All participants were given a vocabulary test, a short 
demographic/education questionnaire, and a working memory test. Participants were also 
given neuropsychological tests to assess general levels of cognitive functioning. Older 
adults were given the Mini-Mental Status Examination (MMSE; Folstein, Folstein, & 
McHugh, 1975) before testing. Both older and younger adults received a FAS test after 
the experiment to assess verbal fluency. Overall younger adults (M = 44.68; SD = 11.29) 
scored higher than older adults (M = 43.36; SD = 11.46) on the FAS test, however this 
difference was not significant F (1, 77) < 1. Younger and older adults’ were also given a 
reading span test to assess their working memory ability. Overall younger adults (M = 
3.03; SD = .97) scored higher than older adults (M = 2.69; SD = .92) on the reading span 
test, however this difference was not significant F (1, 77) = 2.43, MSE = 2.19, 2p = .03. 
Design. The study used a 2x2 mixed design with age (young and old) as the 
between subjects variable and condition (control and corrected) as the within subjects 
variable. Younger and older adults received two incident files (fire and office/missing 
person), one used for the control and the other used for the correction condition. For each 
participant, the order of the incident files were counterbalanced, as well as the condition 
(control or correction) assigned to each file.  
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Materials. Two versions of two different incident files, modified (using more 
standardized American English) from Wilkes and Leatherbarrow (1988), were used. Each 
incident file consisted of 13 discrete messages (See Appendices A and B). The first file 
sequence deals with the progress of a fire at a commercial premise, and the second deals 
with a missing person (MP) and his subsequent accident.   
 Participants reading the control Fire file read 13 messages describing the fire, its 
progress, and its consequences. The fifth message in the sequence referred to the police 
having reports of an empty side room adjoining a storage hall, which, in turn, was full of 
paper and photocopying equipment; the twelfth message was an enquiry from the police 
concerning how the firemen were getting on. For participants reading the control 
Accident file, Message 5 read that MP’s employer said he had finished work at 7:00pm, 
and they go on to learn that he has been involved in a car accident on his way to meet his 
girlfriend after work. Thus, a “personal meeting” subtheme applies to the later details of 
his movements.  
For the corrected version of the fire file, participants read exactly the same 
sequence of messages as the control, except that they were informed on Message 5 that 
the police had reports that the side room contained carelessly stored paint cans and gas 
cylinders. This is corrected at Message 12, after the enquiry about how the investigation 
was proceeding. In the corrected version, the earlier police message (Message 5) is 
denied, followed by the correct description of the empty room. Thus for participants 
reading the control fire file, after they read Message 5, later messages describing various 
features of the fire could be interpreted with reference to the “stored stationary” 
subtheme. For the participants reading the correction however, while this subtheme is 
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available to them, the intervening content could also be interpreted with reference to the 
“volatile materials” subtheme, which in many ways provides a better explanation. For the 
participants reading the corrected version of the Accident file, Message 5 states that MP 
was sent on an emergency delivery by his employer. Only at Message 12 do they learn 
that this was not true, and he finished work at 7:00pm. They, therefore, have the 
additional subtheme of an “emergency delivery” based on the old message, which then 
has to be amended after the correction.  
 Participants were informed at the outset that they will be asked to recall the 
information later. They were told: 
We are interested in how people understand and remember reports. In this experiment 
you will see a series of statements, all of which related to one event. You are to go 
through them at your own pace, then we will ask you to recall what you have seen. Once 
you have turned to a new message please do not turn back and re-read any previous 
information.  
Once participants finished reading the statements they were told: 
Now, we would like you to write down, as accurately as possible, your account of what is 
known about the event in question.   
For both incident files, participants received a 20 item questionnaire, also taken 
from Wilkes and Leatherbarrow (1988). Half of the questions were designed so that they 
could be answered by recalling the literal content (e.g. “When was the fire department 
dispatched?”), whereas the other half of the questions required the use of an inference to 
answer them (e.g. “What could have caused the explosions?”). Participants were also 
given a final question (or two for the accident file), which directly ask about the 
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correction (for the fire file they were asked, “What was the point of the second message 
from the police?” For the accident file they were asked, “What emergency was referred 
to?” and “What was the point of the second message from MP’s employer?”). The order 
of the test questions was randomized for each subject, except that the question(s) 
concerning the correction of the wrong information always came at the end (See 
Appendices C and D). Participants received both questionnaires immediately after 
reading the corresponding incident file.  
 After each question (factual or inference) participants made a Remember, Know, 
or Believe judgment. Then they were ask to rate their confidence level for each question 
on a scale of 1-7.  Then they received instructions (See Appendices E) about how to 
make these judgments after reading the incident reports. The participants were also given 
a demographic questionnaire between the incident files, and they were given a working 
memory test, vocabulary, and FAS test at the end of the experiment.  
4.2 Scoring 
 Free Recall. The message sequences for each treatment group were analyzed into 
their component idea units (using an adaptation of procedures described by Kintsch, 
1974). The recall protocols were scored for accuracy of recall of each unit (the 
information units scored are indicated in the questionnaire, and they do not attempt to 
distinguish all levels of propositional detail). A unit was recorded as being recalled if a 
subject reproduced all or a substantial part of its content; otherwise it was scored as being 
absent. Errors and inferences were recorded separately. The scoring was carried out by 
two judges acting independently.  
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 Comprehension (Questionnaire). The old/new subtheme was used in scoring the 
inference questions on the questionnaire, based on the source of the information 
underlying an inferred answer. The percentage of answers that could be unequivocally 
identified by the judges as deriving from one or the other subtheme (Fire old subtheme= 
volatile materials, Fire new subtheme= stored stationary, Accident old 
subtheme=emergency delivery, Accident new subtheme= personal meeting). Although 
the control group was never exposed to an “old” subtheme, certain questions could be 
answered in a manner that would be scored as “old”. It is possible that participants’ 
answers were not always clear cut, for either file sequence. For example, a participant 
might reply giving more than one answer and draw upon both subthemes. In these cases, 
only a new score was recorded. Alternatively, a participant could give an answer based 
on the old theme but then qualify it later e.g. (for example in the fire file) “According to 
the original message from the police there were gas and paint cans in the storage room. 
However, there is some doubt because later the police changed the statement”. In these 
cases also, the reply was assigned to the new theme. Thus the inferences attributed to the 
old theme for both file sequences were unqualified references to information that had 
been designated as incorrect.  
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5. RESULTS 
 
  The alpha level was set at p < .05 for the following analyses. Effect size (2p) and 
mean square error (MSE) are reported for each statistic. 
 5.1 Recall and Questionnaire 
Free Recall. The free recall test was scored by “idea units”. An idea unit was 
recorded as being recalled if the participant reproduced all or a substantial part of its 
content; otherwise it was scored as absent. Idea units were scored by two judges acting 
independently. Agreement levels for the analysis were high, averaging around 95% 
agreement. We examined the influence of age and condition (inference vs. control) on 
overall recall performance. As expected, the 2 x 2 analysis of variance (ANOVA) showed 
that recall was higher for younger adults relative to older adults F (1, 77) = 23.73 , MSE = 
1.29, 2p = .24. Recall was not influenced by condition, F (1,77) <1, and there was no 
interaction between the age and condition on recall performance, F (1,77) < 1.   
Next, we looked at the participants’ recall of the original message and the 
correction for those participants in the correction condition. For example, in the fire story 
the original message stated that there was paint and gas in the storage room, and the 
correction stated that the room was empty. Results showed that the majority of 
participants recalled both the original message and the correction (75% of younger adults 
and 62% of older adults). This difference in recall for younger and older adults was not 
significant, F (1,77) = 1.65, MSE =.36, 2p = .02. There was no significant difference 
between the number of participants who only recalled the correction (3% of younger 
adults and 10% of older adults recalled only the correction), F (1,77) = 2.0, MSE =.12, 
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2
p = .03. Younger adults were more likely to recall only the original message compared 
to older adults (18% of younger adults and 10% of older adults recalled only the original 
message), F (1,77) <1, though this difference was not significant (see Fig. 1).  
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Fig. 1. Free recall of original message and correction. 
 
Questionnaire Responses. Next, we examined responses to the questionnaires. 
Half of the questions on the questionnaire were inference questions and the other half 
were factual questions. An example, a factual question for the fire story asked, “What 
time was the fire department dispatched?”. (The correct answer is 9pm). Results from the 
2 x 2 ANOVA (for condition and age) showed a main effect of age, F (1, 77) = 8.95, 
MSE = .55, 2p = .10 showing that younger adults remembered more factual information 
compared to older adults. There was no effect of condition, F (1,77) <1 , and no 
interaction between the two variables, F (1, 77) < 1.  
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 Next, we examined younger and older adults’ susceptibility to inferences. As an 
example, an inference question for the fire story asked, “Why did the fire spread so 
quickly?”. The answer to this question was not explicitly mentioned during the story, but 
participants could answer using inferences that they made based on the original message. 
Responses to the inference questions were scored as using either the old subtheme (that 
is, the inference was based on the original message), the new subtheme (the inference 
was based on the corrected information), or some other (nonstudied) subtheme. Using the 
fire story as an example, inference questions were scored as using the old subtheme if 
participants answered the question using the original (incorrect) information regarding 
the presence of paint cans and gas cylinders. Inference questions were scored as using the 
new subtheme if participants answered the question using the alternate information 
regarding the presence of paper and photocopying equipment.  
In the control condition participants never saw the message containing the “old” 
subtheme information (paint and gas), so use of the “old” subtheme in this condition 
provides a measure of baseline performance. The means for the use of the old subtheme 
in the control condition were very low for both younger (M = .04; SD = .08) and older 
adults (M = .01; SD = .05) and, and there were no significant differences between the age 
groups, F (1, 77) = 2.94, MSE = .01, 2p = .04. In the correction condition, results showed 
that both younger adults (M = .28; SD = .19) and older adults (M = .25; SD = .20) used 
the old subtheme even after it has been corrected, F (1, 77) < 1.  
Because there were differences in the level of initial recall performance between 
younger and older adults, we examined the use of the inferences (use of the old 
subtheme) for participants who had recalled both the original and the correction 
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messages. This analysis included 24 older adults and 30 younger adults. Results showed 
that younger (M = .25; SD = .20) and older adults (M = .28; SD = .20) were still equally 
likely to use of the old subtheme, F (1, 77) < 1.  
We also examined the number of older and younger adults who used the old 
subtheme in the correction compared to those who never mentioned the old subtheme. 
However, we found no significant differences between the number of older adults (29 
older adults used the old subtheme at least once, 10 older adults never used the old 
subtheme) who used the old subtheme and the number of younger adults who used the 
old subtheme (32 younger adults used the old subtheme at least once, 8 younger adults 
never used the old subtheme).  
Next we looked at participants’ use of the new subtheme. Participants were 
exposed to the new subtheme in both the correction and control conditions, however in 
the control condition the new subtheme was the only explanation provided as a cause of 
the fire. In the correction condition, participants saw the original message (paint and gas 
in the side room), the correction (the side room was empty) and the information about the 
paper and photocopying equipment in the storage room. In the control condition younger 
adults (M = .52; SD = .17) answered more questions using the new subtheme than older 
adults (M = .41; SD = .19), F (1, 77) = 7.11, MSE = .24, 2p = .09. This is consistent with 
the factual question and free recall data, showing that younger adults have better memory 
for veridical information. In the correction condition, there was no difference in younger 
(M = .33; SD = .23) and older (M = .32; SD = .22) adults’ use of the new subtheme, F (1, 
77) < 1. It seems as if having an alternate explanation, even if it was later said to be 
untrue, decreased the use of the new subtheme for both younger (younger adults were 
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19% less likely to use the new subtheme in the correction condition in comparison to the 
control condition) and older adults (older adults were 10% less likely to use the new 
subtheme in the correction condition in comparison to the control condition). So, 
numerically younger adults seemed to be a little more susceptible to the continued 
influence of the original message.  
It is notable that a large number of responses, particularly for older adults, fell 
into the “other” category. In the control condition younger adults responded to inference 
questions with “other” answers about 44% of the time and older adults about 57% of the 
time, and this difference was significant, F (1, 77) = 11.42, MSE = .35, 2p = .13. In the 
correction condition, younger (39%) and older (43%) adults responded based on an 
“other” subtheme, but this difference was not significant, F (1, 77) = 1.07, MSE = .03, 2p 
= .01. A 2 x 2 ANOVA (for condition and age) showed a main effect of age, F (1, 77) = 
7.90, MSE = .29, 2p = .09, a main effect of condition, F (1,77) = 16.80, MSE = .36, 2p = 
.18, and a significant interaction between the two variables, F (1, 77) = 4.24, MSE = .09, 

2
p = .05. 
 To examine whether the questionnaire data were influenced by condition order 
(the control vs the correction story first), we analyzed the data looking at only the first 
story (control and correction conditions). However, the results were not different from the 
collapsed results. 
Knowledge of the Correction. At the end of each questionnaire participants were 
asked about the point of the critical correction message. For the fire story, the critical 
message was the second message in the list from the police. For the accident story, the 
critical message was the second message from the employer. Participants in the 
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correction condition received a correction to an earlier message, while participants in the 
control condition received a message that simply referred to the progress of the 
investigation. A 2 x 2 ANOVA (for condition and age) showed that overall younger 
adults were more likely than older adults to recall the point of the critical message, F (1, 
77) = 4.56, MSE = 1.08, 2p = .06. Participants had better memory for the critical message 
when it was a correction than a control message, F (1,77) = 21.43, MSE = 4.30, 2p = .22, 
but younger and older adults were not differentially influenced by the condition 
manipulation, F (1, 77) = 1.26, MSE = .25, 2p = .02. Thus, these data show that despite 
the fact that participants, and younger adults in particular, knew that there was a 
correction a large number of both younger and older adults used inferences from the 
original message to answer questions about the stories. Therefore, the younger adult data 
replicates the Wilkes & Leatherbarrow (1988) study, and we were also able to 
demonstrate that older adults are similarly susceptible to this error.  
5.2 Subjective Judgments and Confidence 
Subjective Judgments. Finally, we also examined the subjective experience 
associated with answering factual and inference questions. For each response, 
participants were asked to indicate whether they remembered, knew or believed the 
information. We hypothesized that inferences would be associated with believing, 
whereas factual questions would be associated with remembering. Figure 2 illustrates 
how often participants used each judgment to answer factual questions for both the 
control and correction conditions. Younger and older adults in both conditions gave more 
remember judgments than know or believe judgments to answer the factual questions (see 
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Fig. 2). A 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA (for condition and question type on age) showed that 
remember judgments were most often used to answer factual questions F (1, 77) = 53.32,  
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Fig. 2. Remember/Know/Believe judgments for factual questions.  
 
MSE = 2.90, 2p = .41. However, condition (control or correction), F (1, 77) = 2.05, MSE 
= 3.17, 2p = .03, and age, F (1, 77) < 1, were not significant. Interestingly, the data also  
show that believe judgments were used more often than remember or know judgments 
when answering inference questions, in both conditions, F (1, 77) = 39.53, MSE = 3.15, 

2
p = .34. And similar to remember judgments, condition, F (1, 77) < 1, and age, F (1, 77) 
< 1, were not significant (see Fig. 3). Also, for the know judgments there were no 
significant differences between the question type, F (1, 77) = 2.81, MSE = 1.56, 2p = .04, 
and condition, F (1, 77) < 1. However, there is a main effect of age, F (1, 77) = 5.17, 
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MSE = 11.14, 2p = .06, showing that younger adults gave more know responses than 
older adults. 
 
Inference Questions 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Re
m
em
be
r O
A
Re
m
em
be
r Y
A
Kn
ow
 
OA
Kn
ow
 
YA
Be
liev
e 
OA
Be
liev
e 
YA
Re
m
em
be
r O
A
Re
m
em
be
r Y
A
Kn
ow
 
OA
Kn
ow
 
YA
Be
liev
e 
OA
Be
liev
e 
YA
Correction                                                             Control
Condition
%
 
u
se
d 
 
Fig. 3. Remember/Know/Believe judgments for inference questions. 
 
Participants were also asked to rate their confidence on a scale of 1-7 (with 1 
being the lowest and 7 the highest) for each response following their remember, know, 
believe judgments (see Figures 4 and 5). The confidence data show that younger and 
older adults in both conditions gave lower confidence ratings for believe judgments 
relative to remember judgments (t = 10.08, df = 72, SE = .14). They also gave lower 
confidence ratings for believe judgments relative to know judgments (t = 11.05, df = 64, 
SE = .13). There was no significant difference in confidence rating between remember 
and know judgments (t <1, df = 60, SE = .13). The confidence data also show that older 
adults (M = 5.26; SD = 1.05) were more confident in their overall responses than younger 
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adults (M = 4.99; SD = 1.02) though this difference is not significant, F (1, 77) = 1.33, 
MSE = 2.14, 2p = .02. 
Confidence Judgments for R/K/B Factual Questions
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Fig. 4. Confidence judgments for factual questions. 
 
 
Confidence Judgments for R/K/B Inference Questions
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Fig. 5. Confidence judgments for inference questions. 
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5.3 Additional Tests  
Post-Test Questionnaire. After completing the correction questionnaire, 
participants were given a post-test questionnaire that asked them to describe why they 
believed there was a correction in the story. The answers were separated into three 
responses; cover up, mistake, or other. If the participant believed that the correction was 
just a cover up for something else it was given a cover up judgment, if the participant 
thought the correction was simply correcting an earlier mistake the response was given a 
mistake judgment, or if the participant gave some other reason for the correction that 
could not be placed into one of these two categories it was placed in an “other” category. 
The results indicate that younger adults were more likely to think the correction is a 
cover-up and older adults were more likely to think the correction is a mistake (see Table 
1).  
If participants believed that the correction was a cover-up, and that the incorrect 
information was really true, then they may be more likely to continue using the original, 
incorrect information, when answering inference questions about the story relative to 
people who believed that the correction was a mistake. To test for this possibility, we 
examined the use of the old (incorrect) subtheme in the correction condition for people 
who said the correction was a mistake compared to those who believed it was a cover-up. 
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Table 1 
Reasons Given for Correction: Number of participants who believed the correction was a 
cover up, mistake, or something other 
           Age 
      Younger Adults Older Adults 
 
Response Type 
Cover Up      15   12 
Mistake      18   21 
Other         7     7 
 
 
Participants who thought the correction was a cover-up (M = .26; SD = .18) were more 
likely to continue using the incorrect original message than participants who said the 
correction was a mistake (M = .23; SD = .19) though this difference was not significant, F 
(1, 77) < 1. 
Neuropsychological Test Performance. Reading span test scores were correlated 
with the use of the old subtheme for participants who scored in the top versus bottom half 
on working memory performance. However, we did not find a correlation. The FAS 
scores were also correlated with the inference questionnaire data using the top versus 
bottom half of the data, then we compared the top versus bottom fourth of the data, 
however there were no significant correlations between FAS and use of the old subtheme.  
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6. SUMMARY 
 
The present study examined younger and older adults’ susceptibility to the 
continued influence of inferences. The results are consistent with previous studies 
(Wilkes & Leatherbarrow, 1988) showing that younger adults have a difficult time 
forgetting inferences they make, even though the information that the inferences are 
based on is later shown to be untrue. In addition, we found that older adults are equally 
influenced by the lingering effects of false inferences. Both younger and older adults 
continued to use the old subtheme even though this information had been corrected. In 
other words, having an alternate explanation, even if it was later said to be untrue 
decreased the use of the new subtheme in the correction condition for all participants.  
As mentioned in the introduction, there are reasons to believe that older adults would be 
less susceptible to the continued influence of inferences. One reason for this may be 
because they had difficulty making the initial inferences. Previous research has shown 
that older adults may not be able to make inferences as well as younger adults (Cohen, 
1979; Hasher & Zacks, 1988; Zacks et al., 1987). Older adults are less accurate than 
younger adults when making inferences that are based on implicit facts but not when the 
facts are explicitly stated (Cohen, 1979). This finding suggests that older adults may have 
difficulty generating inferences. In contrast, older adults are likely to show evidence of 
inference generation when the sentences are highly related, when the connection is 
explicitly presented, the inference is highly expected, and when reading is self paced 
(Hasher & Zacks, 1988; Zacks, et al., 1987). This research suggests that older adults may 
be more likely to make an inference if the information is presented in a way that makes it 
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easy for them to do so; as opposed to making the inference because it is necessary for 
comprehension. So, in future studies it may be necessary to make the information that the 
inferences are based on more salient in order to see higher susceptibility in older adults. 
In the current paradigm, even though the correction was explicitly stated, older adults 
may not have relied on this information when making inferences because they may not 
have been able to keep active the original information for the correction, making the 
correction itself less memorable. This could be the reason why we saw so many “other” 
responses from older adults on the inference questions. Another theory states that older 
adults may have been less susceptible to the continued influence of inferences because of 
an encoding deficit. In the present study younger adults did have significantly better 
recall for the stories in comparison to older adults. However, there were no significant 
differences between younger and older adults in their recall of the original message and 
correction in the correction condition.  
 Interestingly, the present experiment also showed that even though younger adults 
remembered the correction more than older adults, they also failed to use the correction 
more often than older adults. This is a surprising finding because it seems that if a 
participant remembers the correction they would be more likely to use it than a 
participant who does not remember the correction, however this was not the case. The 
data from the post-test questionnaire may be able to shed some light on this situation. The 
results from the post-test questionnaire showed that younger adults were slightly more 
likely than older adults to think that the correction was a cover-up, and older adults were 
slightly more likely than younger adults to think that the correction was a mistake. So, 
younger adults appeared to be more suspicious about the reason for the correction 
 33 
compared to older adults. Results showed that participants who thought the correction 
was a cover-up were more likely to continue using the incorrect original information than 
participants who said the correction was a mistake. So, if participants thought the 
correction was not true, then there should have been no reason for them not to use the 
original information when making inferences about the story, whereas if the participant 
believed that the original message was just a mistake and the correction was true, then 
they had no reason not to believe the correction and should no longer use the original 
information when making inferences. 
 If participants do not believe the correction then they will continue using the 
incorrect information. Previous research has shown that providing an alternate 
explanation for the original event has allowed younger adult participants to overcome the 
continued influence effect. This finding explained one way that participants could 
overcome the continued influence effect; however it failed to explain what causes the 
inferences to persist in the first place. The current finding that younger adults do not 
believe the correction provides one explanation as to why the participants continued to 
use the incorrect information when answering inference questions. So, in future studies, it 
may also be possible to get rid of the continued influence effect by making the correction 
more believable. This could be done by making the original information seem more like a 
true accident, than a cover-up. 
 In the current experiment we also examined the participants’ subjective 
experiences. We found that both younger and older adult participants gave more 
remember judgments to factual questions and more believe judgments to inference 
questions. When a participant makes a believe judgment they are saying that their answer 
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feels plausible or they simply believe it to be true. It does not require a person to have a 
recollection for an event or time in the past. So the finding that participants give more 
believe judgments to inference questions suggests that when people make inferences they 
believe them to be true without evidence or support for them. Previous studies have 
shown that people tend to give remember judgments to veridical information, so this 
result was predicted (Perfect & Dasgupta, 1997). However, the second finding was more 
exploratory. The use of a believe judgment (rather than a remember or know judgment) 
suggests that participants knew the information was incorrect but it still felt plausible 
even in the face of counter information. This is an interesting finding because it 
demonstrates that people may go against what they remember or know occurred because 
of a lingering belief that the information might still be true. In addition, the finding that 
participants do actually give more believe responses to inference questions is important 
because it demonstrates that there is a third state of awareness that people will readily use 
when making inferences.  
 Finally, in the present study we also examined participants’ confidence for each 
subjective judgment. The results show that both younger and older adults gave lower 
confidence ratings for believe judgments and higher confidence rating to remember and 
know judgments. There is a debate in the literature about whether or not the know 
judgment is associated with high or low confidence. This is an interesting finding because 
it supports the theory that both remember and know judgments can be associated with 
high confidence (e.g. Yonelinas, 2001).  
 In summary, the results show that older adults are as susceptible as younger adults 
to the continued influence of inferences. One explanation for why older adults did not 
 35 
show a memory deficit in this paradigm is because the critical information was 
meaningful and important for understanding the story. If the critical information was less 
salient we may have seen age effects in memory. However, it is important to note that we 
did find age effects in memory for the correction. The results showed that overall 
younger adults were more likely than older adults to recall the point of the critical 
message. In addition, we found that while participants generally remembered factual 
information, they reported that they believed their inferences to be true.  
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APPENDIX A 
Fire 
 
Control Version 
 
Message 1: January 25th 9:00pm/ Alarm call received from premises of a Whole-Sale 
Stationers/ Premises consist of Offices, Display room, and Storage hall/ 
 
Message 2: A serious fire reported in the storage hall already out of control and requiring 
instant response/ Fire appliance dispatched at 9:00pm/ 
 
Message 3: The alarm was raised by the Night Watchman/ who referred to the presence 
of thick, oily smoke and sheets of flame/ 
 
Message 4: January 26th 4:00am/ Attending Fire Officer suggests that the fire was started 
by a short circuit in the wiring/ of a side room off the main storage hall./ Police now 
investigating./ 
 
Message 5: 4:30am/ Police message received to say that they have reports that the side 
room was empty before the fire/ 
 
Message 6: Fireman attending the scene repot that the fire developed an intense heat that 
made it particularly difficult to bring under control/ 
 
Message 7: It has been learned that a number of explosions occurred during the blaze/ 
which endangered firemen in the vicinity, but no casualties resulted from this cause/  
 
Message 8: Two firemen are reported to have been taken to hospital/ as a result of 
breathing toxic fumes that built up in the area in which they were working/ 
 
Message 9: 10:00am/ The owner of the affected premises estimates that total damage 
will amount to many thousands of pounds (dollars)/ although the premises were insured/  
 
Message 10: The works Foreman has disclosed that the storage hall contained bales of 
paper and a large amount of photo copying equipment/ 
 
Message 11: A small fire had been discovered on the same premises, six months 
previously./ It had been successfully tackled by the workmen themselves/  
 
Message 12: 11:00am/ A second message received from the police enquiring how the 
Brigade’s investigation into the fire was progressing/  
 
Message 13: 11:30am/ Attending Fire Officer reports that the fire is now out and that the 
storage hall has been completely gutted/  
File Ends 
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Corrected Version 
 
Message 5: 4:30am/ Police Received to say that they have reports that inflammable 
material, including paint and gas cylinders, had been carelessly stored in the side room 
before the fire/  
 
Message 12: 11:00am/ A second message received from the Police enquiring how the 
Brigade’s investigations into the fire were progressing/ and also stating that their earlier 
message was incorrect./ The side room had been empty before the fire. / 
 
 
(The units scored at Free Recall are indicated by /………/) 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Accident 
 
Control Version 
 
Message 1: There has been a report of a missing person (MP), a male 21 years old/ filed 
with the police by his parents./ They have not seen him since the previous day/ and there 
is no reason for his absence. / 
 
Message 2: MP employed as a messenger by a local chemist/ who describes him as a 
good employee./  
 
Message 3: A road accident outside the town/ has been reported to the police./ The 
victim has been injured and fits the description of MP./  
 
Message 4: Police measurements at the scene of the accident indicate that the vehicle 
overshot the corner/ and then traveled through a hedge into a field./ It is now being 
checked for mechanical faults./  
 
Message 5: Employer reports that he had last seen MP on Monday evening when he had 
finished work at 7:00pm/  
 
Message 6: A witness traced who describes seeing MP hurriedly leaving the town centre/ 
at 7:15pm/  
 
Message 7: A motorcyclist located who reports being overtaken on the outskirts of town/ 
around 7:25pm/ 
 
Message 8: A motorist reports that MP raced past him near the crash scene/ at 7:45pm on 
Monday/  
 
Message 9: The hospital reports that the victim’s injuries include limbs and concussion./  
 
Message 10: Girlfriend of MP states that she had arranged to meet him on Monday/ at 
8:00pm./ He had not turned  up./ 
 
Message 11: Reports of oil on the road near the accident spot had been received by the 
AA on Monday/  
 
Message 12: Second message from MP’s employers enquiring how he is./  
 
Message 13: The parents of MP have visited the hospital/ and have confirmed his 
identity. /  
 
File Ends 
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Corrected Version 
 
Message 5: The employer reports that he had last seen MP on Monday evening when/ he 
had been sent on an emergency drug delivery to a hospital some miles away./  
 
Message 12: Second message from MP’s employers enquiring how he is/ and also stating 
that their earlier message was incorrect./ In fact MP had finished work at 7:00pm./  
 
 
(The units scored at Free Recall are indicated by /………/) 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Fire Questionnaire 
 
Factual Questions 
 
1. When was the fire department dispatched? 
2. What was the extent of the firm’s premises? 
3. What did the work’s foreman disclose? 
4. How was it thought the fire started? 
5. What was the cost of the damage done? 
6. Where did the alarm call come from? 
7. What features of the fire were noted by the night watchman? 
8. Where was the fire located? 
9. What was the extent of the final damage? 
10. When was the fire eventually put out? 
 
Inference Questions 
 
1. Why do you think the fire was particularly intense? 
2. What did the police investigation reveal? 
3. Is there any evidence of careless reveal? 
4. Why did the fire spread so quickly? 
5. What was the relevance of the side room? 
6. What was the possible cause of the toxic fumes? 
7. Where was the probably location of the explosions? 
8. Are there any reasons why an insurance claim might be refused? 
9. What could have caused the explosions? 
 
Corrected Message Recall 
 
1. What was the point of the second message from the police? 
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APPENDIX D  
 
Accident Questionnaire 
 
Factual Questions 
 
1. How was MP employed? 
2. What was the relevance of the AA’s information? 
3. When did the accident happen? 
4. Why is there no statement from MP about what happened? 
5. When was the accident reported? 
6. Where did the crash occur? 
7. What did the motorcyclist report? 
8. When did MP’s parents learn about the accident? 
9. How long did MP’s parents say he had been missing? 
 
Inference Questions 
 
1. Where was MP going to just before the accident? 
2. When did the chemist last see MP? 
3. Why did the accident happen? 
4. Where was MP going in a hurry at 7:15pm? 
5. What did MP do at 7:00 on Monday? 
6. Did MP expect to meet his girlfriend as arranged? 
7. Who owned the vehicle MP was driving? 
8. What did the police measurements suggest?  
9. Where was MP coming from just before the accident? 
 
Corrected Message Recall 
 
1. What emergency was referred to? 
2. What was the point of the second message from MP’s employer? 
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APPENDIX E  
 
Remember/Know/Believe Instructions 
 
Remember 
 You should make a remember judgment if you can consciously recollect its prior 
occurrence. Remember is the ability to become consciously aware again of some aspect 
or aspects of what happened or what was experienced at the time the report was presented 
(e.g. aspects of the physical appearance of the information, or of something that happened 
in the room, or of what you were thinking or doing at the time). In other words, the 
“remembered” information should bring back to mind a particular association, image, or 
something more personal from the time of study, or something about its appearance or 
position (i.e., what came before or after that message). 
 
Know 
 You should make a know judgment if you recognize the information from the 
report, but you cannot consciously recollect anything about its actual occurrence or what 
happened or what was experienced at the time of its occurrence. In other words, write 
“know” when you care certain that you recognize the information, but it fails to evoke 
any specific conscious recollection from the study time.  
 
Believe 
 When making a believe judgment you don’t have to specifically recall the 
information, but you are indicating that you believe this particular information, it feels 
plausible, or you simply believe it to be true.  
 
To further clarify the difference between these three judgments (remembering, knowing, 
and believing) here are a few examples. If someone asks you who was the first president 
of the U.S. you would typically respond in the “know” sense, without becoming 
consciously aware of anything about a particular event or experience of learning that 
information. When asked about the last movie you saw, you would typically respond in 
the “remember” sense that is, becoming consciously aware again of some aspects of the 
experience of seeing the movie. For example, you might remember where you sat, or that 
you were thinking. Alternatively, if someone asks you whether t.v. is bad for you, you 
may not recollect having learned about this issue and you may not know for sure. Rather 
you simply believe this to be true.  
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